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Explanations of Russia’s foreign energy policy typically focus on major events, such as the
gas conﬂicts with Ukraine, and argue that these events represent simplistic patterns of
behavior, reﬂecting the policy-makers’ emphasis on politics, commercial gain, corruption,
or ad hoc opportunism. This analysis goes beyond these explanations to argue that the
Russian leadership pursues a rational set of political and economic goals in its foreign
energy policy, but that it is constrained in its efforts by the set of tools available to it. To
understand the resulting patterns of behavior, it is necessary to devote more analytical
attention to Russia’s foreign policy tools and their limits. The article draws on a new
dataset of Russia’s policy tools in 31 energy conﬂicts with 20 countries from 2000 to 2010.
These conﬂicts are deﬁning moments in Russia’s foreign policy because they put to the test
the toolkit that Russia has assembled to impose its will on a counterpart. The study ﬁnds
increased use of transit pipelines, generally decreased use of subsidies and persistent use
of efforts to purchase assets in foreign countries, cutoff pipeline supplies, and attempts to
use energy to achieve speciﬁc political goals. By emphasizing the tools that Russian policy-
makers use to conduct policies, the article provides a more nuanced analysis of the
capacity and limits of Russian foreign energy policy than is currently available.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Russia’s patterns of behavior over time
Big events frequently deﬁne perceptions of Russian
foreign policy. In the case of Russia’s energy policy, the gas
conﬂicts with Ukraine of 2006 and 2009 fueled extensiveOrttung), indra.over-
Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyascholarly and media commentary attributing Russian
actions alternatively to strategic considerations, a desire for
proﬁt, corruption and even a set of opportunistic actions
that lacked any coherent overall strategy.
A more effective approach focuses on the insight that
the Russian leadership pursues a rational set of political
and economic goals, but that it is constrained by the set of
tools available to it. In fact, Russia’s limited toolbox in
dealing with other countries structures its behavior and the
nature of its relationship with the countries of the Euro-
pean Union and the former Soviet Union. Since other
discussions of Russia’s foreign policy overlook the impact of
these constraints and their effect on Russia’s policies, they
have a difﬁcult time making sense of Russia’s actions.ng University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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policy is how to understand the mix of political and
economic objectives in Russian policy. Some argue that
Russia is seeking to re-establish some form of empire, while
others focus on a “Russia, Inc.”-model that emphasizes how
the country’s leadership wants to maximize proﬁt. While
Russia pursues both political and economic goals, its
limited set of foreign policy tools means that it has to make
tradeoffs among these goals. Thus, Russia is sometimes
willing to sacriﬁce economic gain to assert political
advantage, and vice versa.
The result is a systematic set of behavior patterns that
repeat over time. Without understanding the limited
nature of Russia’s foreign policy tools, its behavior can seem
irrational. For example, in a seemingly paradoxical manner,
after six years of trying to de-politicize its energy relations
with the countries of the former Soviet Union and maxi-
mize the proﬁts it derived from them, Russia in 2010
offered Ukraine a 30 percent discount on natural gas prices
to extend the lease of the Sevastopol naval base. A
systematic overview of Russia’s foreign policy tools can
explain this puzzle and why Russia returned to the old
practice of subsidies after making considerable progress in
reducing them.
Russia’s leadership seeks to maximize a set of political
and economic goals. In political terms, Russian politicians
work to enhance the power of the state while taking
advantage of opportunities as they appear in the interna-
tional environment. Examples of such political goals
include establishing union states or customs unions with
willing partners, placing military bases in strategic loca-
tions, and supporting friendly governments or under-
mining unfriendly ones. In economic terms, Russia’s
leaders seek tomaximize the revenue ﬂows from its energy
sales. This means reducing exposure to transit countries
that can hold Russian energy sales hostage, forcing all
customers to pay a market-based price reﬂecting EU price
levels, increasing ownership and control of energy infra-
structure, and expanding access to high-proﬁt markets.
Sometimes these economic and political goals are
compatible, but sometimes they are contradictory. They
were most compatible after the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine, which brought to power a pro-Western govern-
ment hostile to Russia. No longer wishing to support
Ukrainewith gas subsidies, Russia’s political leadership and
Gazprom’s managers were in agreement that the time was
right to raise prices. When Russia’s political and economic
goals clash with each other, Russia’s policy-makers must
make tradeoffs in the way that they use the tools available
to them.
Since energy and other commodity exports make up
a large part of Russia’s gross domestic product and exports,
it has few other tools to use in inﬂuencing international
politics outside of military affairs. Shutting off gas pipelines
or providing price subsidies are blunt instruments in
achieving Russia’s broader goals, but they are the only ones
available. Therefore the structure of Russia’s energy tools
shapes the patterns of its international behavior.
The article proceeds in the followingway. First, it situates
our argument about the constraints imposed by Russia’s
limited toolbox within the existing literature to show howa focus on tools builds on and extends our current under-
standing of Russian foreign policy behavior. Second, it
introduces a new dataset, describing the energy conﬂicts
Russia has engaged in and the tools it has used to achieve its
goals over the past decade. The third section examines the
patterns we identiﬁed in the ways that the Russian policy-
makers use the tools available to them. Finally, the conclu-
sion summarizes theﬁndingsof the studyandexplainswhat
they mean for policy-makers.
2. Alternative explanations
2.1. Strategic drivers
Among the most common assertions about Russian
foreign policy is that strategic considerations are the key
driving force in Russia’s oil and gas sector. The main
assumption for this approach is that Russia’s political
leaders use energy to pursue advantages in other areas,
such as protecting their political power from instability at
home and expanding Russian inﬂuence abroad. On the
domestic front, it is argued, Gazprom cannot be understood
in “strictly conventional economic terms” since the Russian
government uses the company’s vast resources to subsidize
the energy needs of Russian households and factories (Van
Der Meulen, 2009, 847). Even before he rose to power,
Putin took an interest in how Russia’s energy resources can
best serve the interests of the state (Balzer, 2007). With the
appointment of Alexey Miller as the head of Gazprom
shortly after Putin took ofﬁce as president at the beginning
of 2000, the company’s new management became so close
to the president that it was difﬁcult to see any difference in
their overall strategy beyond Gazprom’s unfulﬁlled desire
to end domestic price subsidies, which heavily undercut its
proﬁt margin (Stern, 2005, 197). As chairman of the Board
of Directors in the years before he became Russia’s third
president, Dmitry Medvedev was the overseer of Kremlin
policy in the gas company, making the close ties between
the company and Russia’s political leadership undeniable
(Mukhin, 2006, 114).
In the foreign policy sphere, this approach takes as
a given that energy is part of Russia’s geopolitical strategy
to enhance its power among countries. Accordingly, Russia
uses its energy power to maintain a sphere of special
interest, prolong the existence of military bases, bolster
separatist entities, and support the election of sympathetic
leaders in the post-Soviet area. Some scholarly works
worry that the EU is dangerously dependent on Russian gas
supplies (Baran, 2007; Cornell & Nilsson, 2008). Effectively
stoking these fears, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has
called the East Siberian-Paciﬁc Ocean pipeline, the ﬁrst
phase of which opened in December 2009, a “geo-political
project,” having in mind the idea that being able to supply
Asia with energy will make Russia much less dependent
on its European customers than it is today (Poussenkova,
2010, 111).
The corollary of this thesis is that Gazprom “often acts as
a tool of Russian foreign policy” (Kupchinsky, 2008). Its
corrupt dealings through a web of intermediaries spread
Russian inﬂuence into a divided Europe that lacks
a coherent policy to protect itself (Lucas, 2008).
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suggesting that Russia should create a “liberal empire” from
the remnants of the Soviet Union. He meant in particular
that Russia should play a leading role in the business and
commerce of its neighboring countries. His view contrasted
with the ideas of Yevgeny Primakov, who sought to
counter-balance the inﬂuence of the US through a more
autarkic structure in the former Soviet Union that would
ultimately rely heavily on continued Russian energy
subsidies (Tsygankov, 2010)
The conclusions of this approach are ominous for energy
security. A large role for politics implies that Russia is not
focused on developing and bringing its energy resources to
market as efﬁciently as possible, particularly in light of
International Energy Agency predictions that Europe’s
natural gas demand will pick up in the medium term as the
effects of the global economic crisis fade. Additionally, the
strong ties between Gazprom and Russia’s domestic polit-
ical system suggest that there is little hope for reforms that
would end Gazprom’s monopoly on gas transportation and
distribution and partial monopoly on gas production;
decouple the company’s management from the country’s
political leadership; or diversify the economy away from its
reliance on energy resources (Ahrend & Tompson, 2005).
While this approach contains many useful insights, its
falls short by overestimating Russia’s actual power. Since
Russia is dependent on the income it generates from energy
resources, it cannot use them at will. In particular, it often
has difﬁculty converting its vast resources into effective
instruments of inﬂuence.
2.2. Economic drivers
In contrast to analyses that argue that politics are the
main driver in Russia’s foreign energy policy, others see
proﬁt as the key to understanding Russian policy. Accord-
ing to this approach, while Russia’s actions may have
political implications, they are fundamentally driven by
commercial concerns and the advancement of corporate
proﬁts. Thus, for example, whereas Russia’s energy strategy
adopted in 2003 claimed that “The role of the country in
the global energy markets largely determines its geopolit-
ical inﬂuence,” by the time the country adopted a revised
version in 2009, it had instead begun to focus much more
on economic drivers, arguing now that “The goal of Russia’s
energy policy is to ensure . strengthening of its global
economic positions” (Poussenkova, 2010, 108).
Accordingly, while some see Russian efforts to buy up gas
distribution companies in European markets as a Russian
endeavor to gain political inﬂuence over these countries,
there is a strong commercial rationale to these actions. Most
importantly, in the late 1980s, Gazprom realized that selling
its gas at the border of a country was not nearly as proﬁtable
as distributing it to the ﬁnal customer and that many of its
foreign partners were making large proﬁts in the retail
distribution sector by reselling Russian gas (Stern, 2005, p.
111–2). When Ruhrgas refused to let it into the lucrative
German market, Gazprom struck a deal with Wintershall,
creating Wingas, which gave it access to the German retail
sector and a share of the rewards to be earned there. Since
then, Gazprom has bought up a variety of distribution assetsin a wide range of European countries in order to increase
proﬁts from its gas sales.
The implications of this approach are much less pessi-
mistic than the politics-driven model. It suggests that
business interests are paramount in the Russian energy
sector and that proﬁt-driven concerns will eventually lead
Russia into mutually beneﬁcial relationships with its
neighbors and trading partners. This view suggests that
there can be a separation between politics and business
and that large energy corporations can have some auton-
omous power in the Russian context. It also suggests that
Russia can be incorporated into an international system in
which trading partners are mutually dependent on each
other and therefore less likely to display aggressive
behavior toward each other.
However, this approach falls short because it does not
pay enough attention to Russia’s political behavior. For
example, the case mentioned above of Russia trading
a hefty price discount with Ukraine for a military base
cannot be explained within this model.
2.3. Corruption drives policy
A third approach emphasizes corruption and informal
practices as a driving force in Russian policy. International
groups like Transparency International (2009) consistently
rank Russia as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world. The Russian energy sector is both a cause of this
corruption and suffers heavily from it.
This approach posits that a small group of individuals
with close connections to Russia’s leaders gain outsized
beneﬁts fromRussia’s energy sector. The extensive roleof the
state in the energy sector creates considerable space for
corruption. Analysts worry, for example, that cronies
running thestate corporationsmaybeusing themasvehicles
for personal enrichment (Heinrich, 2008b, 1544). Particu-
larly important to this analysis is the fact that top-level state
ofﬁcials frequently sit on the boards of energy companies.
Likewise, Russia’s most prominent businessmen have close
personal ties to the country’s political leadership. Such
analyses focus on the role of the St. Petersburg lawyers in
Gazprom (Kroutikhin, 2008, 26; Panyushkin & Zygar, 2008,
238) and the siloviki in the oil sector (Panyushkin & Zygar,
2008, 236–7; Taylor, 2007, 49). The lack of secure property
rights in Russia encourages companies to adopt short time
horizons in their planning and corrupt the very nature of
Russianpolitics (Gaddy& Ickes, 2005;Kryukov&Moe, 2007).
The implications of this perspective for Russia’s develop-
ment are naturally bleak.
While a focus on corruption highlights many features of
Russian reality, it is not feasible to explain all Russian
foreign energy policy moves in terms of this one factor, as
some decisions are clearly politically motivated and when
decisions are proﬁt-motivated this clearly also beneﬁts the
Russian state through taxes and its ownership stakes in
Gazprom, Rosneft and other companies.
2.4. No coherent policy
Robert Legvold presents the most articulate version of
the idea that Russia has no strategic vision in the energy
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insecure and have given little thought to Russia’s goals. In
their world view, no one country is an enemy and none is
an ally (Legvold, 2008, 10). He goes so far as to argue that
Russia’s leaders have no overall vision of how the world
should be or Russia’s place in it, noting that Russia’s policy
is internally contradictory and argues that the mere desire
to keep control over the Russian energy system and expand
the inﬂuence of Russian companies abroad does not
amount to a strategy.
Former Deputy Energy Minister Vladimir Milov, now an
opposition politician, and his colleagues concur that
a “systematic Russian energy policy does not yet exist”
(Milov, Coburn, & Danchenko, 2006, 311). They argue that
Russia’s policy is fragmentary and contradictory and is
driven by short andmedium term interests that do not take
into account the capital-intensive nature of the industry.
A key piece of evidence supporting the “no strategic
plan” perspective is the major battle that took place over
the subsoil law reform during most of Putin’s presidency.
While the overall thrust of the reform was to strengthen
state control over Russia’s natural resources, the process
revealed that the state was far from monolithic. As the
debate over the law continued, the Kremlin frequently
changed its priorities regarding the desirability of foreign
investments and a variety of ministerial and corporate
players sought to adjust the eventual legislation according
to their preferences (Adachi, 2009; Fortescue, 2009).
According to this school of thought, the changing prior-
ities and power conﬁgurations among the players in the
Russian energy industry have led to suboptimal outcomes
for Russia’s energy policy. Even with the apparent centrali-
zation of power and control that tookplace after 2000, Putin
and his team still lacked awell deﬁned set of objectives and
a coherent strategy for achieving them. Nowhere is this
problem more visible than in the Far East and with Russia’s
efforts to become a major energy supplier on the Asian
market. A 2009 analysis, for example, points out that Rus-
sia’s constantly changing domestic priorities signiﬁcantly
delayed the ﬂows of oil and gas to China (Eder, Andrews-
Speed, & Korzhubaev, 2009, 220).
While this approach also provides useful insights, it is
not capable of explaining the clear trends and patterns that
do appear in Russia’s foreign energy policy. For example,
Russia’s concerted effort to eliminate energy subsidies to its
foreign partners over a six-year period indicates that its
foreign energy policy may be more consistent than this
approach would make us believe.3. The data
To tease out the patterns in Russia’s international
behavior, we collected data on the political, economic,
legal, public relations, and military tools Russia used in
pursuing its goals in energy conﬂicts with countries in the
former Soviet Union and the European countries to Russia’s
west. These conﬂicts are deﬁning moments in Russia’s
foreign policy because they test the capacities of the toolkit
that Russia has assembled to impose its will on a counter-
part. Ultimately, we identiﬁed 31 energy conﬂicts with 20countries during the period 2000–July 2010. A quantitative
summary of this research is presented in Tables 1–3. In the
following discussion we explain how we set geographical
and temporal boundaries for the dataset, explain how we
collected the data, and deﬁne the terms that we use in the
analysis. After presenting this methodological material, we
turn to an analysis of the trends in the data.
We did not include Asian countries in this analysis
because so far they play a small role in Russia’s energy
exports, though this role will likely increase rapidly during
the coming years. Table 1 provides a list of the countries
where conﬂicts took place. European and FSU countries not
listed there were not involved in a major energy conﬂict
with Russia.
The 2000–2010 period starts with the rise of President
Vladimir Putin to the presidency and his continuing role
as Russia’s most prominent leader to the time of writing.
This period is starkly different from the ﬁrst decade of
Russia’s post-Soviet existence. During the 1990s, the
Russian state had little control over Gazprom or the key
oil companies and many of its energy deals with foreign
countries were conducted partially or wholly on the
conditions of barter. When Putin came to ofﬁce in 2000 he
reasserted state control over Gazprom and began
a process of ending all barter agreements and monetizing
all energy deals, meaning that business relations began to
assume a more formal nature and there was potentially
greater transparency.
A team of four research associates and the authors
collated information about the conﬂicts from an extensive
search of the secondary literature on Russian foreign
energy policy as cited in the bibliography. Additionally, we
combed Russian, West European, and US press reports in
several languages and conducted several interviews with
energy industry executives with knowledge of the conﬂicts
but who typically wished to remain anonymous.
We registered an event as an “energy conﬂict” if it
received attention in the expert literature and press,
signaling that it was something different than what takes
place on a day-to-day basis between two countries. For
example, Ukraine and Russia have had numerous energy-
related disputes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but
it is the events of January 2006, January 2009, and April
2010 that particularly stand out. In these cases, respec-
tively, Ukraine and Russia engaged in conﬂicts over gas
pricing, payment and ﬂows; Russia tried to use energy to
inﬂuence Ukraine’s elections; and traded a gas price
discount for continuing its lease of the Sevastopol naval
base. If a conﬂict lasted longer than a year, we counted it
once and placed it in the year that it was resolved or
reached a peak in intensity. Within the framework of this
analysis, we did not include conﬂicts that took place on
Russian territory. Therefore there is no discussion of the
disagreements over the development of Sakhlin’s resources
or the Stokhman and Kovykta deposits.
This analysis focuses on oil and gas and does not address
other forms of energy, such as coal and nuclear. Most of the
conﬂicts we identiﬁed focused on Russian natural gas sales.
Logically, this makes sense because there is a functioning
international market for oil, but so far there is not one for
natural gas.
Table 1
Chronological distribution of energy conﬂicts by country.






Belarus 1 1 1 1 4











Georgia 1 1 1 3
Azerbaijan 1 1
Turkmenistan 1 1 2
Kazakhstan 1 1 2
Total 1 2 1 1 3 2 6 5 3 5 2 31
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and its foreign energy policy without further discussion of
which speciﬁc Russian actors we actually have in mind. We
have chosen this formulation because it is simpler, because
ultimately Russia is a country and has a foreign policy, and
because both of Russia’s two main energy exporters, Ros-
neft and Gazprom, are government controlled. This should
not, however, be taken to mean that we believe that Russia
is a coherent or unitary actor.
4. Energy conﬂicts
Despite the broad range of countries included in the
analysis, there were only a limited number of objects of
contention in the conﬂicts (See Table 2).4.1. Price
Conﬂicts over price occurred when Russia and its
customers could not agree on what constituted a fair price
for oil and natural gas sales. In most cases, these disputes
were between Russia and former Soviet countries as Russia
sought to end its policy of providing blanket subsidies to its
natural gas customers. This type of dispute also occurred in
sales of pipeline oil in which the sides could not agree.
While Russia is typically the seller, it buys gas in Central
Asia and seeks a lower price from suppliers. In 2004,Table 2
Chronological display of dispute type.
Type of dispute
Price (of oil/gas/transit)
Volume of required buys
Allowing construction of transit pipeline
Asset ownership
Political goal (military base, inﬂuence elections, undermine other pipeline, etc
TotalTurkmenistan cutoff gas shipments to Russia because it did
not accept the price that Russia was offering.
Russia’s policy target has been to move all customers to
European price levels by 2011 (Mitrova, Pirani, & Stern,
2009, 395). However, it has also shown ﬂexibility in how
its deals with pricing, making it possible for some countries
to trade infrastructure assets or political goods for lower
prices. As the discussion in the next section shows, this
ﬂexibility over what could be a straightforward commercial
relationship often gets tangled in a variety of other issues.
As a result, it is not clear what price levels and what time
horizons Russia would consider a reasonable, partial
success in pursing this policy target.
4.2. Volume of sales
Russia typically sells natural gas on the basis of long-
term contracts that include “take-or-pay” clauses
(Gazprom, 2010a, 63). In some cases, however, countries
agree to purchase much more gas than they need on the
basis of faulty predictions. Efforts to undo these conditions
led to tensions between buyers and sellers.
4.3. Asset ownership
The category of asset ownership refers to a dispute over
the ownership of a transit pipeline or the purchase of2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
1 2 1 3 4 1 2 1 15
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 1 2 4 3 2 13
.) 1 1 1 1 1 5
1 0 3 1 4 1 8 8 4 7 2
Table 3
Russia’s use of the most potent tools in energy conﬂicts.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Subsidies (# of countries) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 4 4 4 4 n/a
Subsidies ($ billion) – – 1.8 2.7 4.3 12.8 17.3 12.9 18.8 5.2 n/a
Oil, gas pipeline
shutoff/reduced ﬂow
1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 11







  Nord Stream
 Baltic Pipeline System-2
South Stream
Note: See text for explanation of the lines and arrowheads representing pipeline planning, launch, and continuing use. Sources for calculations of subsidies:
(Gazprom, 2007, 52; Gazprom, 2010a, 2010b, 55–6; Mitrova et al., 2009, 396; Pirani et al., 2010, 7, and various press reports).
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market or a reﬁnery or other energy-related asset. Gazprom
typically has sought to purchase the pipelines through
which its energy supplies travel to European markets by
way of transit countries. It also has sought to purchase
signiﬁcant energy infrastructure in foreign countries and
has tried to gain as much access to foreign domestic retail
markets as possible because such access enables it to derive
much higher proﬁts than selling gas wholesale at the
border of consumer countries (Pirani, 2009a, 93). In some
cases Gazprom has also sought to buy important reﬁneries
in foreign countries.
Typically, Gazprom would prefer to have a majority
stake in the assets it buys with the ability to control the
actions of the company. In practice, however, foreign
countries do not want to turn over key energy assets to
Gazprom or other Russian companies because they fear
that it threatens their energy security and sovereignty. As
a result, Gazprom will often get a ﬁfty percent stake that
does not give it control over company actions. Accordingly,
purchasing an asset without full control over its use often
does not resolve the issue at the heart of the conﬂict as the
discussion of Belarus shows below.2
4.4. Allowing construction of a transit pipeline
As Russia builds new transit pipelines to circumvent
transit partners with which it has difﬁcult relations, it
needs to gain permission from other countries to build
a pipeline across their territory. In Estonia, Russia’s plans
ran into political objections, while the pipeline faced
concerns about espionage and damage to the environment
in Sweden and Finland (Grib, 2009, 108–22).
4.5. Political goals
In some instances, Russia seeks to use its energy to
achieve political goals. Such goals include a wide range of
activities: forming a union with another country (Belarus),2 On ownership with and without control, see Luong, 2010.setting up a customs union, retaining the lease to a military
base, obtaining general foreign policy support, inﬂuencing
elections in another country, blocking the expansion of
NATO or the stationing of US weapons and troops, and
destabilizing countries like Georgia which host alternative
pipelines that are beyond Russian control. Russia’s pursuit
of these goals is opportunistic and contingent on the
current political situation.
4.6. Other disputes
This list of energy disputes is far from exhaustive. Other
conﬂicts include, for example, disputes over non-payment
for gas supplies. We did not include those as a separate
category here because they are typically part and parcel of
disputes over pricing. Additionally, there are other cate-
gories, such as the on-going tension over how to divide up
rights to the resources located under the Caspian Sea. Since
it focuses on territorial issues, that conﬂict is of a different
nature than the conﬂicts discussed here and the subject of
numerous separate studies.
5. The most potent tools
Russia has a variety of tools that it can use in concluding
its energy disputes favorably.
5.1. Subsidies
The most powerful tool is price subsidies in which
Russia offers countries natural gas at levels below the going
price in Western Europe. Throughout the 1990s and in the
ﬁrst part of the new decade, Russia typically provided
subsidies to countries in the former Soviet Union. However,
in 2004–2005 it decided to end this practice and began
moving the prices for most of its customers up to the
European level. The ofﬁcial goal was to have one price for
all customers by 2011.
Trying to determine the size of Russia’s gas subsidies
involves a number of methodological difﬁculties. In
contrast to the oil market, there is no one set world price for
gas, or even for Russian pipeline gas. Each country signs
R.W. Orttung, I. Overland / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 74–8580a separate agreement with Russia and the terms of this
agreement are usually secret. However, it is well known
that the gas price is usually connected to the oil price with
a six month lag. In the calculations used here, for the
average “European” price we relied on Gazprom data for
the years 2002–2004 and the numbers provided by the Gas
Program of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES)
for 2005–2009. The prices for the individual countries
come from the OIES Gas Program and press reports. The
volumes of gas bought come from OIES for Russia, Belarus
and Ukraine and fromGazprom for the other countries. The
calculation of the subsidy for each country each year is
simply:
ðthe European priceÞ  ðthe price paidÞ
 ðthe volume importedÞ
¼ subsidy
The overall calculation of the subsidy given here can only
be considered a rough estimate for several reasons.
Different sources provide different price levels and it is
hard to know which is the most accurate. Additionally,
since Russia uses a host of opaque intermediaries in its
energy dealings, identifying the real price requires addi-
tional computations. For example, in 2006–2008 Ukraine
paid 20 percent more than the nominal price because it
gave the intermediary RosUkrEnergo 20 percent of the gas
it received for the services that company provided (Chow &
Elkind, 2009, 83). Additionally, a more-ﬁnely calibrated
measurement of the subsidy for a country like Ukraine
would require knowing howmuch its transit fees for Russia
differed frommarket prices and howmuch Gazprom paid it
for use of its storage facilities.5.2. Oil, gas pipeline shutoffs
We counted these shutoffs as events when Russia
substantially reduced or completely shutoff the amount of
oil or gas ﬂowing through its pipelines. In this count, we did
not include mere threats of shutoffs because these are
much more numerous and therefore hard to count
systematically, though such data would make an excellent
basis for a future study. We also did not include any minor
incidents that did not attract much press attention.5.3. Pipeline explosions
In two cases (Georgia in 2006 and Turkmenistan in
2009) we counted pipeline explosions as a form of shutoff.
While there is no conclusive evidence to prove that Russia
was responsible for these events, there is plenty of
circumstantial evidence that points to the use of this
extreme measure as a tool of foreign energy policy. In the
case of Georgia, the pipeline connecting Russia to Georgia
through South Ossetia mysteriously exploded at a time
when Russia was seeking to put intense political pressure
on its southern neighbor (Goldman, 2008, 150). In the case
of Turkmenistan, the pipeline exploded in 2009 at a time
when Russia had agreed to buy a large volume of Turkmen
gas at a high price but the onset of the global economiccrisis meant that Russia did not need this gas. The Russians
claimed that the event was an “accident” (Gazprom, 2010a,
66), but Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister claimed that
Russia caused the explosion by shutting off the pipeline
without sufﬁcient warning.
5.4. Constructing alternative transit pipelines
In cases where Russia repeated conﬂicts over time with
a transit country on price issues, it has resorted to the
practice of building newpipelines that avoid the territory of
the recalcitrant partner. The lines in the graphic begin
when serious discussions about constructing the pipeline
started and the arrowhead marks the time when the
pipeline shipped its ﬁrst gas (Yamal-Europe shipped ﬁrst
gas in 1997). The line continues on to the right from the
arrowhead to show that the pipeline is still in use and
provides Russia greater capacity to avoid problemswith the
troublesome transit country. When the lines reach to
the left border, discussions about construction began in the
1990s. When the line continues onto the right border and
there is no arrowhead, construction is underway (BPS-2
and Nord Stream) or is yet to begin (South Stream).
TheadditionofNordStreamandSouthStreamwouldgive
Russia signiﬁcant leverageoverUkraineandBelarus. In2008,
Russia sent 116.9 bcm of gas through Ukraine to European
customers, using most but not all of Ukraine’s 145 bcm
capacity (Pirani, 2009b). Belarus has capacity of 48 bcm
(Yaﬁmava, 2010, 3). The addition of 55 bcm from Nord
Stream (set to be completed in 2012) and possibly 30 bcm
from South Stream, would give Russia the ability to signiﬁ-
cantly curtail ﬂows through Ukraine and/or Belarus. Addi-
tionally, the added capacity would allow Russia to play the
two countries off against each other and extract better deals.
As part of its effort to monopolize pipelines, Russia
employs a variety of tools to block the construction of
alternative pipelines, such as Nabucco, which would serve
the samemarket as South Stream.We did not have space to
include those negative efforts into this study.
5.5. Other tools
Russia employs a variety of additional tools in resolving
its energy conﬂicts. These include heated rhetoric, import
bans on non-energy goods (mineral water, wine, meat),
cyber attacks, personal relationships, sophisticated PR
campaigns, court cases, and military saber rattling. Within
Russia, the authorities have turned to such techniques as
environmental regulations and denying visas to foreign
citizens. While important, these tools do not have the
powerful impact of the ones listed above. For that reason
we did not include a discussion of them in this study, but
they are all candidates for further study.
6. Patterns in the data
6.1. General observations
The data we collected on Russia’s energy conﬂicts make
clear a number of patterns. Russia had the most energy
conﬂicts – four each – with Ukraine and Belarus. These
Fig. 1. Estimated Russian energy subsidies to the FSU.
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and oil to the lucrative European markets upon which it
depends. Next on the list is Georgia, with three conﬂicts.
Georgia has suffered poor relations with Russia since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, culminating in the 2008 war.
There were two major disputes with Turkmenistan. Russia
has in the past depended on Turkmenistan for natural gas
supplies so that it can fulﬁll its domestic and foreign obli-
gations. Until 2009 Russia did not pay market prices for
Turkmenistan’s gas, leading to conﬂict as Turkmenistan
sought a higher price. Once the global ﬁnancial crisis hit,
Russia wanted to get out of its obligation to buy Turkmen
gas, leading to additional conﬂict.
With most other countries Russia has had no more than
one energy conﬂict in the last decade. Russia has not had
more than one energy conﬂict with any European Union
country. This track record suggests that Russia has not
sought to use the energy weapon against these countries in
a consistent manner over time. While the various bilateral
relations may be better or worse, major energy conﬂicts
have not been a central feature of them.
Looking at the material chronologically, 2006 and 2007
were peak years for disputes, with 6 and 5 respectively, and
a secondwave in 2009, with 5 (See Table 1). These numbers
reﬂect Russia’s efforts to impose European prices for its gas
sales. Concomitantly, Russia made a greater effort to take
control of energy assets in foreign countries during this
period.
Looking at the type of dispute, prices were the most
contested topic, with 15 conﬂicts overall. In second place
was asset ownership, with 13. By contrast, there were only
5 conﬂicts that involved political objectives (See Table 2).
6.2. Decreased use of subsidies, with one exception
Until the beginning of 2006, Russia automatically
provided energy subsidies in its gas sales to the countries of
the former Soviet Union. These subsidies were a holdover
from the Soviet era, when the Soviet Union provided cheap
energy to the Eastern European countries in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in order to tie them
closer to the Soviet bloc and prevent potential defections to
the West (Closson, 2010). In the period 2004–2005, Gaz-
prom and Russia’s political leaders decided that they would
essentially charge one price to all customers for its natural
gas, thereby ending subsidies to many of the countries of
the former Soviet Union (Mitrova et al., 2009, 395). Russia
declared that the one gas price for all CIS countries would
be based on the German price minus the cost of trans-
portation (Grib, 2009, 56). Some countries, generally ones
that had poor overall relations with Russia, would have
subsidies cut by the end of 2006 (the Baltic states, Georgia,
and Azerbaijan). The others (Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine,
Belarus) would transition to the new system gradually and
begin to pay market prices in 2011. In addition, Russia also
cracked down on implicit subsidies to Belarus through oil
sales (Grib, 2009, 60–5).
The data presented in Table 3 and Fig.1 show that Russia
has been effective in implementing this policy. The number
of countries receiving subsidies dropped from 9 to 4 in
2007. The amount of subsidy has also dropped dramatically.Subsidies provided to former Soviet countries reached
a peak of $17.3 billion in 2006, declined to $12.9 billion in
2007, rose to $18.8 billion in 2008 (mainly because the
price of natural gas went up much faster on the market
than for Russia’s subsidized customers) and then fell
dramatically in 2009 to $5.2 billion. While the subsidies in
2009 were still much larger in dollar terms than they had
been at the beginning of the decade, they were indeed
much smaller than in previous years.
The decision to get all customers to pay West European
prices is the most important change in Russia’s use of
energy tools. It marks a transition from a policy that sought
to win political support among former Soviet countries
through subsidies to a focus on depoliticizing gas sales in
favor of trying to extract maximumproﬁts out of them. This
move seemed to start the process of putting the Russian gas
sector on a ﬁrmer footing that would allow it tomeet future
demand. Importantly, bringing prices up to the West
European level will make it possible to ﬁnance infrastruc-
ture investments inside Russia (Pirani, 2009a, 3). These
investments will help the country replace its rapidly
depleting existing ﬁelds with new production sources.
However, while Russia has made signiﬁcant progress in
doing away with these subsidies, it carried out the transi-
tion process in a political manner. Rather than charging
each country the same higher price, it seemed to play
favorites. Thus, for example, in 2009 Belarus paid $151 per
thousand cubic meters while Ukraine paid $232.54. Belarus
received this discount because it had generally better
relations with Russia and agreed to sell a 50 percent stake
in its BelTransGaz pipeline network to Russia (Pirani, Stern,
& Yaﬁmava, 2010, 6).
The policy of insuring a uniform price seemed to end in
April 2010 when Russia and Ukraine signed a deal that gave
Ukraine a 30 percent discount on gas prices through 2019
in exchange for a 25-year extension of the lease on the
Russian military base at Sevastopol. The overall discount
comes off a price then Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko and Putin negotiated in 2009 that is higher
than the price that European countries pay (Pirani et al.,
2010, 12). The agreement is expected to cost Russia about
$3 billion a year, and the Russian state has agreed to pick up
the bill rather than forcing it on Gazprom, further under-
lining the political nature of the agreement (Pirani et al.,
2010, 22).
Russia’s decision to resort to subsidy pricing for Ukraine
in 2010 demonstrates the limited nature of its foreign
policy toolbox. After Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, it
was relatively easy for Gazprom and Russia’s political
Table 4
Gazprom ownership of gas assets in CIS countries.





Source: (Gazprom, 2010a, 2010b, 43; Mitrova et al., 2009, 411).
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sia’s political and commercial interests were in alignment.
Politically, Russia no longer wanted to support the Ukrai-
nian government, which had adopted a pro-Western policy.
Russia’s leaders declared that “subsidizing hostile-minded
quasi-democratic regimes in these countries did not make
sense” (Tsentr politicheskoi informatsii, 2008, p. 22).
Commercially, it wanted to make bigger proﬁts.
With the election of Victor Yanukovych in January 2010
and Ukraine’s adoption of a much more Russia-friendly
policy, the situation changed. Now Russia had a political
interest in cooperating with Ukraine. While Gazprom still
sought to make a proﬁt, the Russian state wanted to take
advantage of the opportunity Yanukovych’s election
offered and signed the deal to extend its lease on the Sev-
astopol naval base. Beyond cheap energy, Russia had little
else to offer Ukraine which would be of sufﬁcient value.
With its energy-intensive chemical and metallurgy indus-
tries and its inefﬁcient domestic energy system, Ukraine is
highly dependent on Russian gas.
Russia’s decision to revise its policy of charging one
price to all gas customers will repoliticize its energy rela-
tions. Rather than maintaining energy sales as a purely
commercial proposition, this deal has opened the door to
a variety of other negotiations. The consequence is to
muddle Russia’s foreign energy policy again, and to create
conditions that may facilitate the outbreak of more energy
conﬂicts in the future.6.3. Persistent efforts to purchase assets in foreign countries
Gazprom efforts to purchase transit pipelines have
generally been ineffective. In some countries, the company
has not been able to purchase the assets it wanted.
Ukraine’s leadership has never been willing to sell its
pipeline infrastructure and that position seems unlikely to
change in the future. Local opponents of such sales gener-
ally argue that selling off important energy assets would be
a violation of the country’s sovereignty. Georgia has also
been traditionally unwilling to sell its main North-South
pipeline to Russia, but the Georgian parliament was
considering a plan to privatize the link in July 2010. The
pipeline allows Russian gas access to Armenia.
In other countries, Gazprom has been able to purchase
assets, but not always with the desired effect. Within the
former Soviet Union, Gazprom has bought distribution
assets in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova (See
Table 4). While there have been few problems in Armenia
and Kazakhstan, Gazprom has had difﬁculties with Belarus
and Moldova, even though it owned 50 percent of the
pipeline in each case (Aslund, 2010,159). The situationwith
Belarus has been particularly troublesome. After the 2007
gas dispute with Russia, Belarusan leader Alexander Luka-
shenko agreed to sell Gazprom 50 percent of Beltransgaz in
quarters over the four years from 2007 to 2010. But later it
became clear that this did not give Gazprom the right to
operational management of the company or the ability to
make strategic decisions without Lukashenko’s permission.
Gazprom tried to buy one more share that would give it
control of the company, but failed (Grib, 2009, 59).Without control of the pipeline, Gazprom has run into
the same kind of transit problems with Belarus that have
plagued its relationship with Ukraine. Gazprom again
shutoff gas supplies to that country in June 2010 (Yaﬁmava,
2010). Gazprom’s inability to buy and control the pipelines
meant that it had to resort to a different tool to ensure the
passage of its energy supplies to the lucrative European
market.
Within the former Soviet Union, Gazprom has gained
access to domestic markets in Armenia and Ukraine,
supplying relatively small amounts of gas to local
customers. In 2009, it supplied 1.85 bcm to Ukrainian
enterprises and 1.7 bcm to customers in Armenia
(Gazprom, 2010a). Gazprom may be able to increase gas
supplies to Ukraine in the future (Grib, 2009, 82; Pirani
et al., 2010, 29).
In addition to selling gas to EU countries at their
borders, Gazprom has sought to purchase distribution
assets inside these countries. The EU countries have often
blocked the sales, citing concerns about handing over such
strategic assets to a Russian company that is closely con-
nected to the Russian state (Grib, 2009, 27–9; Heinrich,
2008a). In some countries, Gazprom has run into consid-
erable resistance. The most notable problems came when
Gazprom tried to purchase Centrica, the largest gas
distributor in the UKmarket, in 2006 andwhen it sought to
buy 20 percent of the Spanish oil company Repsol in 2007–
2008. In both cases, the respective governments took
actions to discourage the sale. Additionally, an agreement
with ENI that would have allowed for direct sales in Italy of
3 bcm beginning in 2010 ultimately fell through in 2008
when the sides could not agree on the price. However,
Gazprom did go ahead with plans to send 1 bcm of gas to
supply Italian power stations (Grib, 2009, 139).
Despite these problems, Gazprom has made some
progress in entering foreign markets. It set up Wingas in
Germany with partner BASF-Wintershall in 1993 and it
supplies 13 percent of the Germanwholesalemarket. It also
has acquired assets allowing it to sell gas in the Baltic
countries as well as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and
Slovakia. In 2009, Gazprom reported sales of 1.8 bcm in the
UK and France, nearly doubling the previous year’s sales
(Gazprom, 2010a, 64).
Target countries often fear that Gazprom will gain
control of their markets and force prices up, but the actual
impact of Gazprom’s arrival depends on its position in the
market. If it were to form a deal with a local monopolist, the
result is likely to be higher prices. Gazprom’s arrival in
Germany, however, actually had the opposite effect by
making gas cheaper for consumers. Since its partner in
Germany was not the dominant seller in the market, the
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on the domestic market (Finon & Locatelli, 2008, 435–6;
Stern, 2005, 111–2). While the price dropped, Gazprom
ultimately made considerable proﬁts through increased
sales and because prices are anyway higher the closer one
gets to the consumers.
6.4. Increased use of transit diversiﬁcation pipelines
Russia has built alternative pipelines to support a transit
diversiﬁcation policy since themid-1990s, as Table 3 shows.
Early efforts to use this strategy were not always successful,
because Russia’s new transit partners were often not more
cooperative than the previous ones. Nevertheless, Russia
has stuck with this instrument, eliminating the previous
source of problems in some cases, but not all.
Pipelines are among the most sensitive aspects of the
energy sector because they directly link seller and buyer in
long-term price and supply arrangements that can effec-
tively reduce the role of the market in setting energy prices.
Where pipelines are built determines who makes money
and who wields political power. Russia’s main problem is
that it is geographically separated from its wealthiest
customers by such transit countries as Ukraine, Belarus,
and Poland. During the Soviet era, Moscow controlled these
territories, so they did not cause problems in delivering
energy to western Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, however, there have been numerous disputes over
transiting energy.
The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline through Belarus was
constructed to avoid transit through Ukraine, where Russia
had been involved in several quarrels. However, Belarus
often proved to be no more cooperative than Ukraine did,
leading tomajor conﬂicts in 2004, 2007, and 2010, so Russia
did not gain the beneﬁts it hoped for from the newpipeline.
Additionally, the threat of sending gas through Belarus did
not convince Ukrainian actors to change their behavior
(Mitrova et al., 2009, 426).
In order to avoid problems with both Belarus and
Ukraine, Russia set on the strategy of building pipelines to
the north and south of these troublesome countries.
Construction began on the Nord Stream pipeline in 2010
and is set to be complete in 2012, while discussions are still
underway for South Stream. With a plethora of pipelines to
choose from, Russia expects to be able to arbitrage among
countries to get better terms.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these tools is hotly
debated. Nord Stream connects Russia to Germany through
the Baltic Sea, so it avoids non-marine transit partners
entirely allowing Russia to avoid a repeat of the Yamal-
Europe experience. South Stream, however, transits
a number of countries (Turkish territorial waters, Bulgaria,
Greece, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia) before reaching the last
customers (Italy, Austria), so may repeat Russia’s earlier
experiences with Belarus. The cost of building the under-
water Nord stream is about $15 billion, which is muchmore
expensive than the overland EU-Ukraine deal of March 23,
2009, which could improve the capacity of Ukraine’s
existing infrastructure for just $3.5 billion (Aslund, 2010,
163). However, simply improving Ukraine’s transit capacity
will not solve the numerous problems that Russia has hadwith the country in the past. Although the new pipeline is
relatively expensive, it may ultimately prove to be
commercially viable.
Building both Nord Stream and South Stream will not
allow Russia to eliminate completely the need to transit gas
through Ukraine and Belarus. But the new pipelines will
give Russia the kind of leverage over the countries that it
has not had previously. In this sense, while the use of
transit pipelines has not been particularly effective in the
past, it could prove more useful in the future.
6.5. Persistent use of pipeline cutoffs
Russia has used pipeline shutoffs consistently over the
decade (Table 3), with 11 major episodes. The peak number
of cutoffs came in 2006 and 2007, with the 2006 and 2009
New Years shutoffs to Ukraine gaining extensive interna-
tional attention. While the use of shutoffs has been most
prominent in relations with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia
has applied this technique against a wide variety of coun-
tries since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the
targets have been Moldova (Grib, 2009), Latvia (Ciziunas,
2008, 301), Lithuania (Ciziunas, 2008, 299), and China
(Barnes, 2009). Although Russia has never directly targeted
West European countries with a gas cutoff since 1968,
when energy deliveries started, its 2006 and 2009 disputes
with Ukraine had a powerful impact on the South-Eastern
and Central Europeans who receive Russian gas via Ukraine
(Larsson, 2006, 265). While the West has been immune
from gas cutoffs, it has been a Russian target in the oil
sector: in 2007 and 2008, Lukoil cut oil supplies to the PCK
German reﬁnery at Schwedt in a dispute over prices and
ownership. Russia’s use of cutoffs is relatively unusual in
the international energy trade since “contract renegotia-
tions normally do not involve cutting off supplies” (Closson,
2009, p. 97).
Russia’s use of this tool caused it signiﬁcant reputational
damage internationally. After January 2006, for the ﬁrst
time, European consumers had reason to questionwhether
Russia was a reliable energy supplier. The 2009 cutoff to
Ukraine and south-eastern Europe did even more damage.
However, the Russian actors may have seen it as necessary
to put heavy pressure on Ukraine sooner or later in order to
get the Ukrainians to accept higher prices, and that Gaz-
prom’s reputation was an unfortunate sacriﬁce in this
context – or possibly, the Russian leaders underestimated
the reputational damage that the cutoffs would cause.
Ultimately, the damage was not sufﬁcient to prevent
Germany and other partners from going ahead with Nord
Stream.
6.6. Limited efforts to use energy to achieve political goals
In a handful of cases during the last decade, Russia has
used its energy resources to achieve explicit political goals.
In 2000 and 2006 it applied heavy pressure on Georgia in
efforts to inﬂuence elections there and to demonstrate
anger against the government’s pro-Western policies.
Energy, however, did not play a central part in the 2008
war, where the action focused on the separatist regions.
Russia also sought to inﬂuence Ukrainian elections in
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ordered Gazprom to halt advance payment of transit fees
for the second quarter of 2010 until Russia knew who
wouldwin the January 2010 presidential elections (Reuters,
2009). Additionally, the day after the Czech Republic signed
an agreement with Washington to place a missile defense
system on its territory in July 2008, Transneft cut oil
deliveries to the country by 40 percent, citing commercial
and technical reasons (Larrabee, 2010, 44).
With the exception of the incident in the Czech
Republic, the explicit use of energy instruments for political
purposes focused on Ukraine and Georgia, the two coun-
tries in the former Soviet area that have had the worst
relations with Russia. Russia typically does not use energy
instruments in EU countries to achieve explicitly political
goals. In this light, the decision to trade a 30 percent gas
discount for a 25-year lease for Russia’s naval base in
Ukraine stands out as unusual because it is so explicit in its
political nature.
7. Conclusion
The tools available to the Russian leaders shape the way
they pursue their goals. In general terms, Russia seeks to
expand its political inﬂuence abroad and maximize proﬁts
from its energy sales. In seeking to achieve these objectives,
Russia has a limited toolbox available to it, putting tight
constraints on what it can do.
Over the decade 2000–2010, Russia’s foreign energy
policy has changed in signiﬁcant ways. The construction of
new pipelines around Ukraine and Belarus will give it much
greater leverage over these countries than it has had in the
past and should fundamentally transform the nature of
their relations. On the other hand, Russia has effectively
reduced the size of its toolbox by largely giving up the use
of subsidies to neighboring countries between 2006 and
2010.
Ultimately, Russia’s power is tightly constrained by the
tools available to it. This predicament became most clear in
April 2010 when Russia returned to the practice of
providing price subsidies to Ukraine in order to secure an
extension of its military base. Beside cheap gas, Russia has
little to offer Ukraine of any value. In providing subsidies for
purely political reasons, Russia has opened the door to
a variety of further political negotiations involving energy
costs and ﬂows. The result is that we are seeing a return to
the pre-2006 pattern in Russia’s energy relations in which
subsidies played a political role. In order to maintain its
political inﬂuence in Ukraine, Russia must sacriﬁce some of
its commercial energy interests.
These ﬁndings are signiﬁcant for scholars of Russian
foreign policy because they demonstrate the limits that the
tools Russia uses impose on what policy-makers can do. By
focusing on strategic, economic, and corrupt objectives,
other analyses of Russian foreign policy have failed to
highlight this crucial insight.
The results are also important for policy-makers. They
can better anticipate Russia’s future moves by having
a clear understanding of the tools that Russia employs in its
energy policy and the limits that these tools impose. While
the toolbox is changing over time – more transit routes,fewer subsidies – the limits of the tools available will
provide clear constraints on Russia’s ability to achieve
political objectives in the former Soviet Union and the EU.Acknowledgements
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